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CHAPTER 18 
State and Municipal Government 
JOSEPH C. DUGGAN 
A. COURT DECISIONS: STATE GOVERNMENT 
§18.1. Massachusetts Parking Authority: Eminent domain power. 
The independent power of a parking authority created by the state 
legislature to take land by eminent domain without approval of a city 
was decided in Appleton v. Massachusetts Parking Authority.1 Man· 
damus proceedings were brought by residents of the Commonwealth, 
protesting a taking order by the Massachusetts Parking Authority, 
which had been authorized, pursuant to the statute2 creating it, to 
construct and operate the Boston Common Garage. 
In determining that the Parking Authority had the power to take 
the locus by eminent domain, the Supreme Judicial Court held that in 
passing the statute, the legi.slature did not intend to give the city of 
Boston veto power except in cases in which the land sought to be taken 
or conveyed fell within the purview of Sections 5(i) and 7 of the Park· 
ing Authority Act. The Court further stated that when, as in the 
present case, the Authority withdrew its application for a conveyance 
under these sections, it could then proceed under the general eminent 
domain power contained in Section 5(k) of the Parking Authority Act, 
without the necessity of any permission or approval by the city of 
Boston. 
§18.2. State jurisdiction over milk control. In Cumberland Farms, 
Inc. v. Milk Control Commission,! a decision of the Superior Court 
reviewing an order of the Milk Control Commission fixing minimum 
retail milk prices was not reviewed because the Commission order had 
been repealed before the case was considered by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. Because certain provisions of the Milk Control Act required 
proper interpretation, however, the Court felt that expression of its 
views thereon would be desirable for future guidance of the parties. 
Accordingly, the Court determined that: 
JOSEPH c. DUGGAN is a member of the Massachusetts and Federal Bars and prac-
tices in New Bedford. He is City Solicitor for the city of New Bedford and was 
formerly Assistant Attorney General of the Commonwealth in charge of the Crimi-
nal Division. 
!i18.I. 1340 Mass. 303, 164 N.E.2d 137 (1960), also noted in §§12.8, 13.9 supra. 
2 Acts of 1958, c. 606. 
§18.2. 11960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 541, 166 N.E.2rl 356, also noted in §12.9 supra. 
,--_ .•. _--------------_. 
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(1) The jurisdiction of the Commonwealth over the field of milk 
control was not superseded or pre-empted by the federal Agricultural 
Adjustment Act under which the Federal Government exercises juris-
diction in the same area. 
(2) The provision in the statute, G.L., c. 94A, §12, conferring au-
thority upon the Milk Control Commission to amend or rescind the 
prices fixed by its order, should be construed to require approval by 
the Milk Regulation Board of each amendment to an original order 
of the Milk Control Commission containing findings that a state of 
emergency exists and that minimum retail milk prices must be fixed. 
(3) Since Section 12 is the only section conferring authority upon 
the Milk Control Commission to establish minimum retail prices, fail-
ure to comply with that section in amending the original order in-
validates the amended order; the Court ruled that a majority of the 
members of the Milk Regulation Board would be required to confer 
approval within the meaning of the statute and, consequently, a two-
to-two vote was without effect. 
(4) The word "consumers" as used in the context of Section 11 of the 
Milk Control Act refers to processors of such milk products as butter, 
ice cream, cheese, and the like; the legislative intent was not to include 
retail buyers within the definition of the word "consumers." As a re-
sult, therefore, Section 11 of the act concerns only the fixing and control 
of minimum wholesale prices. 
B. COURT DECISIONS: MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
§18.3. Public works: School contract. In]. D. Ahern Co. v. Acton-
Boxborough Regional School District} the Supreme Judicial Court 
was faced with a situation in which a painting contractor had sub-
mitted a subbid on a school contract and filed bid security in the 
amount of $1000 with the bid. Before the contract was awarded, the 
plaintiff sought to withdraw its bid on the ground that it contained 
figures that were grossly erroneous. Withdrawal was not allowed and 
the officials of the regional school district accepted the plaintiff's bid. 
The plaintiff thereupon refused to execute the contract. 
Award of the contract was made to the next lowest bidder at an 
additional cost of $1000 over the bid of the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
thereupon sued to recover its bid deposit, its principal contention be-
ing that the general contract was invalid because the defendant school 
district had rejected all bids for heating and ventilation, and, conse-
quently, any subcontract between the plaintiff and the general con-
tractor would have been illegal and void. 
In the court below, judgment was rendered for the defendant school 
district, and in affirming the judgment, the Supreme Judicial Court 
concluded that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate or prove that it was 
aggrieved by the action of the defendant in its rejection of the heating 
§18.3. 1340 Mass. 355, 164 N .E.2d 313 (1960). 
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and ventilation bids. The Court further pointed out that the plaintiff 
was dilatory in raising this contention; had it done so at the time it 
refused to perform the contract awarded to it, the defendant could 
probably have avoided the improper procedure. 
§18.4. Collection of municipal taxes. In a case confirming the 
plenary power of a municipality to collect taxes due, even though 
statutorily required procedural requirements are not complied with, 
the Supreme Judicial Court decided that failure to send out tax bills 
on or before the date required by law did not prevent or bar collection 
by the city. In City of Boston v. DuWors,1 the defendant landowner 
received a bill for taxes which was not mailed until September 22, al-
though the governing statute provided that tax bills "shall be sent out" 
not later than June 14 and are payable on July 1. The defendant 
refused to pay the tax, and suit for recovery was commenced by the 
city; while the suit was pending; the defendant applied for an abate-
ment. The District Court below found for the city, and the Appellate 
Division dismissed the report. 
In affirming the order dismissing the report, the Supreme Judicial 
Court determined that a collector of taxes can sue for their recovery 
any time after they become due and payable; the city's right to recover 
was not affected either by the fact that the statutory provision on the 
date of billing was not complied with or the fact that the defendant 
applied for abatement after commencement of the suit. 
§18.5. Workmen's compensation for public officer. In Bruno's 
Case,1 the factual situation presented was that of a town selectman 
who was injured while performing his statutory obligation to peram-
bulate the town boundaries and who, while in the performance of this 
duty, received an injury. The selectman applied for workmen's com-
pensation and was refused payment. In holding that the selectman 
was not entitled to compensation, the Supreme Judicial Court stated 
that an elected officer performing official duties is not an employee 
within the meaning or scope of the workmen's compensation law, even 
though the selectman could have hired an employee to perform the 
boundary inspection task for him. 
§18.6. Standing of town as an aggrieved party in Department of 
Public Utilities dispute. Under G.L., c. 25, §5, the town of Wilming-
ton filed a petition of appeal, seeking a review of a decision of the 
Department of Public Utilities on a petition of the Boston and Maine 
Railroad for discontinuance of certain passenger stations and passenger 
service. The Department and the railroad demurred on the ground 
that the town had no standing under Section 5 to obtain a review of 
the Department's decision. 
The case and the question involved were reported by a single Justice 
without decision and were considered by the Supreme Judicial Court 
§18.4. 1340 Mass. 402, 164 N.E.2d 1lll (1960). 
§18.5. 1340 Mass. 420, 165 N.E.2d 93 (1960). 
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on the petition for appeal and the demurrers.1 In deciding the issue, 
the Court first ruled out the contention of the town that it could be a 
party in the case by virtue of the provisions of G.L., c. 40, §5(16), 
which defines the purposes for which a town may spend money and, 
by including litigation, does not purport to define the nature of pro-
ceedings in which a town may have power to bring suit. To uphold 
the contention of the town in this regard, the Court said, would result 
in "bypassing" Section 1(3) of G.L., c. 30A (State Administrative Pro-
cedure Act), which defines parties who may intervene in adjudicatory 
proceedings. 
Under the Administrative Procedure Act §1(4)(c), it was determined 
that the town was a person allowed by the agency to intervene in the 
original proceeding, and accordingly it became an "aggrieved party in 
interest" under G.L., c. 25, §5. 
Noting that the town was uniquely qualified to present the views 
and interest of that portion of the commuting public residing therein, 
the Court approved the exercise of discretion by the Department of 
Public Utilities in permitting the town to intervene, and pointed out 
that while the Attorney General customarily represents the "public 
interest," such representation very often is not adequate when various 
contrary interests each assert that their position is the one in the "pub-
lic interest." The Court noted that, upon appeal of a decision by the 
Department of Public Utilities, the Department would be represented 
by the Attorney General, and, consequently, he could not represent 
commuters whose interest would conflict with the decision of the 
Department. 
§18.7. Merger of easement in tax title. In 1934, the city of Boston 
acquired tax title to a certain locus, and in 1941, by order of the Street 
Commissioners, the city took an easement to lay and maintain a sewer 
through the locus. The order provided that no betterments were to 
be assessed for the making of the improvement, and shortly thereafter 
the city took an easement to lay and maintain sewage works on a por-
tion of a private way, in part at least on the locus. 
After the recording of the second taking in March, 1941, all rights 
to redeem the tax title were foreclosed, and, subsequently, the interest 
of the city in the locus, acquired by tax title in foreclosure, was con-
veyed to two contractors as tenants in common. The contractors there-
upon started to construct houses on the locus, and drains from these 
houses were connected to the city sewer in the private way. The Street 
Commissioners informed the contractors that they would be required 
to pay an "entrance fee" for the sewer connections from the houses to 
the sewer. 
In determining the issue, the Court held that the city, by its deed, 
conveyed all interest in the locus acquired under the tax title and fore-
closure, and that this prevented any question from arising as to whether 
§18.6. 1 Town of Wilmington v. Department of Public Utilities. 340 Mass. 432. 
165 N.E.2d 99 (1960). also noted in §15.l supra. 
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the easement was merged in the fee while the city held the property.1 
While determining that there was no statutory authority for the city 
to require either a permit or a fee for connection with the existing 
sewer, the Court observed that since the locus had not been burdened 
with any assessment for betterment which had been paid (one made in 
1950 was subsequently abated), the city could still impose an assess-
ment for betterment. The Court further held that the deed from the 
city to the contractors implied a reservation of the recorded sewer 
easement. 
§18.8. Police pension under "Heart Law." The widow of a re-
tired city policeman brought an action in contract to recover damages 
for refusal of the city manager to award her an annuity. The husband 
of the plaintiff, a police officer, had been retired because of affliction 
with a heart disease, and died two years later of a heart attack. The 
plaintiff applied for an annuity under G.L., c. 32, §89, which grants 
annuities to widows of municipal employees who die as a result of ex-
posure to hazards peculiar to their employment while in the perform-
ance of official duties. Section 94 of Chapter 32 states that impairment 
of the health of policemen caused by heart disease is "presumed to be 
sustained in the line of duty unless the contrary be shown by com-
petent evidence." The plaintiff's application was referred to a medical 
panel, which certified that there was no evidence showing that the 
plaintiff's deceased husband died from injuries received in the perform-
ance of his duties as a police officer. Therefore, the city manager re-
jected the plaintiff's application; the court below ordered judgment 
for the plaintiff. 
The defendant city filed exceptions to the judgment, and in a deci-
sion sustaining the exceptions, the Supreme Judicial Court determined 
that since no annuity was granted, there was no indebtedness from the 
city to the plaintiff, and, consequently, she had no action at law as a 
basis for her suit.1 The Court, however, then proceeded to indicate 
that the plaintiff widow would have a right (which apparently could 
still be enforced in a proper action) to require the medical panel to 
determine specifically whether the death of her husband was the result 
of a different heart disease from that with which he was afflicted at the 
time of his retirement. If the heart disease causing the husband's 
death was not different from that for which he was retired, the pre-
sumption of Section 94 would still be operative, and presumably the 
plaintiff would be entitled to the annuity. 
§18.9. Demolition of building by municipal order. The Building 
Commissioner of the city of Boston, after condemning a building as 
unsafe and dangerous, and notifying the owner by mail (the letter was 
never received by the owner), posting notice on the building itself, and 
obtaining approval from the mayor, entered into a contract with a 
§18.7. 1 O'Malley v. Commissioner of Public Works of Boston, 340 Mass. 542, 
165 N.E.2d 113 (1960), also noted in §1.9 supra. 
§18.8. 1 McLean v. City of Medford, 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 483. 166 N.E.2d 219. 
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wrecking company to demolish the building. The owner subsequently 
sued in tort against the wrecking company, with his declaration con-
taining counts for trespass, damage to real estate, and conversion of 
personal property.! In holding that the defendant wrecking company 
was authorized to proceed as it did under its contract with the city, the 
Court decided that the plaintiff could not raise collaterally the issue of 
whether the building was in fact dangerous and unsafe. 
The Court distinguished the situation in the present case from that 
in Miller v. Horton,2 which dealt with a statute authorizing destruc-
tion of horses afflicted with glanders without notice to the owners. 
The owner of a destroyed horse was allowed to sue and raise the ques-
tion whether the horse was afflicted with the disease at all. The Miller 
case was not followed because the building condemnation statute pro-
vided the property owner with the opportunity in the original proceed-
ing for hearing and review on the question whether the building should 
be demolished. Since the plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies, he was not permitted to raise the question in a suit against 
the present defendant, who acted in good faith under an official order. 
With regard to the count concerning conversion of personal property, 
the Court decided that the provision in the demolition contract author-
izing the defendant to remove all materials from the premises, these 
materials to become his property, did not confer upon him the right to 
remove lumber stored in the basement of the demolished building. 
Noting that nothing in the evidence indicated an abandonment of the 
lumber, and that the building code was silent upon the question of 
personal property found in the condemned building, the Court ruled 
that the city could have stored this personal property at the expense 
of the plaintiff and, consequently, the defendant was not entitled to a 
directed verdict on the conversion count. 
§18.10. Municipal water contract. Under a special statute enacted 
in 1915, the Salisbury Water Supply Company was organized to supply 
water under contract to the town of Salisbury. From 1949 to 1956 the 
company made contracts with the town to construct water line exten-
sions, which were installed at an aggregate cost of $91,000. Each con-
tract provided that the town would pay annually to the company a 
sum which, when added to the company's operating revenues from the 
particular extension, would provide the company with a net return of 
6 percent of the actual cost of the extension. In 1957, the town refused 
to make further payments on current contracts, and suit was brought 
by the water company to recover from the town the payments it alleged 
were due under the contracts.1 
The town defended on the ground that G.L., c. 44, §31, as amended, 
rendered the contracts void by prohibiting towns from incurring liabili-
§18.9. 1 DiMaggio v. Mystic Building Wrecking Co., 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 555, 
166 N.E.2d 213, also noted in §12.1O supra. 
2152 Mass. 540, 26 N.E. 100 (1891). 
§18.l0. 1 Salisbury Water Supply Co. v. Town of Salisbury, 1960 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
715,167 N.E.2d 320. 
• 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1960 [1960], Art. 21
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1960/iss1/21
202 1960 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §18.11 
ties in excess of an annual appropriation. ' The Court disposed of this 
defense by stating that the water company contracts were not in, any 
degree affected by Section 31, and that such town contracts, designed 
to induce local public utilities to provide facilities for services to be 
furnished to the town and its inhabitants, where the services are to 
be paid for in part by the town currently from year to year, may be 
regarded as within the express or implied contract authority of towns.2 
Accordingly, the water bills and taxes each year covered the town's cur-
rent obligation under the contracts, thus making the payment arrange-
ments between the town and the Water Company a cash transaction. 
§18.11. Referendum on subject of vetoed city ordinance. In De-
cember, 1958, which was a year "other than a regular municipal elec-
tion year" under G.L., c. 44, §33A, by an affirmative vote of more than 
two thirds of the city council there was passed over the veto of the 
mayor, an ordinance to become effective January 1, 1959, which granted 
a 10 percent wage increase to New Bedford policemen and fire fighters. 
Two days after this action, on December 17, 1958, a referendum peti-
tion was filed protesting the ordinance. Several members of the police 
and fire departments brought a bill of complaint seeking to restrain 
the city council and the city clerk from further action upon the ordi-
nance, and a restraining order issued.1 The bill of complaint was 
amended to ask for a declaratory decree, and the same plaintiffs sought 
a writ of mandamus to command the same officials not to proceed fur-
ther in respect of the ordinance. After hearing in the Superior Court 
upon an agreed statement of facts, the referendum petition was deter-
mined to be valid, and the bill was dismissed as to matters not pertinent 
to the bill for declaratory relief. In the mandamus proceedings, there 
was an order for judgment for the respondents. On appeal, the plain-
tiffs presented the question of the effect of G.L., c. 44, §33A, upon the 
referendum provisions of the New Bedford Plan "B" Charter, G.L., 
c. 43, §42. 
The provision in SectIon 33A relied upon by the plaintiffs provides 
as follows: 
Notwithstanding any contrary provlSlon of any city charter, no 
ordinance providing for an increase in the salaries or wages of 
municipal officers or employees shall be enacted except by a two 
thirds vote of the city council, nor unless it is to be operative for 
more than three months during the financial year in which it is 
passed; provided, however, that in any year other than a regular 
municipal election year, ordinances may be enacted by a two thirds 
vote during the month of December providing for an increase in 
the salaries and wages of officers and employees, to become effective 
as of January first of the next ensuing year. 
2 Smith v. Town of Dedham, 144 Mass. 177,10 N.E. 782 (1887). 
§18.ll. 1 Morra v. City Clerk of New Bedford, 340 Mass. 240, 163 N.E.2d 268 
(1960). 
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In affirming the order for judgment below, the Supreme Judicial 
Court decided that the provisions for a referendum were not contrary 
to the requirements of Section 33A, and that the referendum petition 
forces reconsideration by the city council and provides in effect a voters' 
veto,2 and that there was nothing in the nature of Section 33A calling 
for its exemption from the referendum procedure. 
C. LEGISLATION: STATE GOVERNMENT 
§18.12. Priority of candidates' names on state primary ballots. 
Chapter 216 of the Acts of 1960 amended G.L., c. 53, §34 by providing 
that the names of the candidates for offices of which they are elected 
incumbents or incumbents chosen by the General Court, appointed by 
the Supreme Judicial and Superior Courts, or appointed by the Gov-
ernor, are to be placed first in alphabetical order on state primary 
ballots and the names of other candidates are to follow in like order. 
§18.13. Registration of motorboats. Chapter 275 of the Acts of 
1960, approved on April I, 1960, placed the use and operation of motor-
boats under a broad regulatory scheme similar to that governing the 
use and operation of motor vehicles. Just as the use and operation of 
motor vehicles are regulated by Chapter 90 of the General Laws, the 
use and operation of motorboats and certain other vessels are regulated 
and controlled by the new legislation, which constitutes Chapter 90B. 
As enacted, the statute subjects motorboats, divided into four classes 
according to length, to regulatory controls when used or operated in all 
coastal and inland waters of the Commonwealth except in ponds less 
than 10 acres in area, owned by one person and not open to the public. 
The new statute requires registration of motorboats, and is replete 
with provisions designed to insure their operation in accordance with 
strict standards providing for the safety of the operator, passengers, and 
the public. An administrative agency, designated as the Division of 
Motor Boats, is created within the structure of the Registry of Motor 
Vehicles, and is administered by a director, appointed by the Governor 
for a term of seven years, who is the executive and administrative head 
of the division. 
§18.14. Merit rating under the Highway Safety Act. Chapter 390 
of the Acts of 1960, in summary language, repealed Sections 5 to 10, 
inclusive, and Section 16 of G.L., c. 90A, thus abolishing the point sys-
tem under which the operating record of owners and licensees of motor 
vehicles were evaluated for determination of the continuing qualifica-
tions of such persons for the rights and privileges granted by virtue of 
motor vehicle registrations and licenses to operate. 
2 Section 42 of the City Charter and Chapter 43 of the General Laws provide that, 
upon filing of the referendum petition, the ordinance shall be suspended from 
taking effect, and that the city council shall reconsider it, and if it is not e~ltirely 
rescinded, the city council shall submit the same to the voters, and the ordmance 
shall beCome null and void unless a majority of the registered voters vote in favor 
of it. 
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D. LEGISLATION: MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT 
§18.15. Hearing aids for needy school children. Chapter 3 of the 
Acts of 1960 amended G.L., c. 40, §5, Cl. 40, by authorizing cities and 
towns to appropriate money to provide needy school children with 
hearing aids in addition to the existing authority to provide eyeglasses 
and spectacles. 
§18.16. Time of application for absentee ballots. Chapter 16 of 
the Acts of 1960 amended G.L., c. 54, §89, by providing that no appli-
cation for an absentee voting ballot will be deemed to be seasonably 
filed unless received by the city or town clerk before noon on the day 
preceding the election for which the absentee ballot is required. 
§18.17. Vacations for permanent policemen and fire fighters. The 
two weeks' vacation period for regular or permanent police officers or 
fire fighters who have served for at least six months will henceforth 
accrue on January 1 of each year. Chapter 154 of the Acts of 1960 
conferred this benefit by amending G.L., c. 41, §lllA, to provide that 
January 1 in each year will replace April 1 as the effective date for 
accrual of vacation benefits. 
§18.18. Power of local health boards to enforce minimum housing 
standards. Section 2 of Chapter 172 of the Acts of 1960 clarified the 
powers of local boards of health to enforce minimum standards and 
other provisions of the state sanitary code, by conferring upon them 
power to require, upon proper notice, the owner or occupant of any 
type of structure either to vacate or to put the premises in a clean con-
dition, upon a determination that the structure or building is unfit for 
human habitation, is or may become a nuisance, or is or may be a cause 
of sickness or accident to the occupants or the public. The act requires 
a copy of the notice to be served upon any mortgagee of record. In 
the event of failure to comply with the order of the board of health, 
the occupant may be forcibly removed from the premises or the prem-
ises may be properly cleaned at the expense of the owner. If within 
one year from the date of closing the premises, compliance with mini-
mum standards of fitness for human habitation has not been effected, 
the board of health may remove or demolish the building, and the ex-
pense of the removal or demolition will constitute a debt owing to the 
city or town from the owner, who may be sued in an action of contract. 
§18.19. Signatures required for nomination of town officers. Chap-
ter 224 of the Acts of 1960 amended the election laws by providing' 
that nominations of candidates for city or town elections, except where 
city charters or the law provides otherwise, may be made by procuring 
signatures of a number of voters equal to 1 percent of the entire vote 
cast for governor at the preceding biennial state election in the district 
or division wherein the candidate is to be elected; but in any case no 
less than twenty nor more than fifty signatures of votors are required on 
the nomination papers for such town office. 
§18.20. Additional salary for municipal treasurers for services as 
9
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custodians of retirement funds. Under the provisions of Chapter 240 
of the Acts of 1960, cities and towns are authorized to compensate their 
treasurer in an amount not to exceed $500 per annum for services ren-
dered as custodian of the funds of municipal retirement systems. The 
act provides that the additional compensation is to be paid from the 
expense account fund of the retirement system. 
§18.21. Minimum annual compensation for fire fighters. Section 
108D of G.L., c. 41, was amended by Acts of 1960, c. 260, to provide 
that, after affirmative vote by a majority of the members of the city 
council, subject to charter provisions, and in a town by a majority vote 
of the town meeting, the minimum annual compensation of permanent 
fire fighters will be not less than $5500. 
§18.22. The "Open Meeting" law. The first paragraph of G.L., 
c. 39, §23a, was rewritten by the provisions of Acts of 1960, c. 274. The 
amendment reflects an attempt on the part of the General Court to 
clarify and define the instances when city and town boards, commis-
sions, and agencies must conduct their proceedings in sessions open to 
the public and to the press. Prior statutory law was somewhat ambigu-
ous as to when a municipal board, commission, or agency could invoke 
parliamentary procedure to convene in executive session. Since every 
municipal agency which convenes in regular session is affected by the 
new statute, its full text is set out below: 
All meetings of every district, city and town board, commiSSlOn 
and school committee, and the meetings of the governing board of 
every local housing authority, shall be open to the public and to 
the press unless such board, commission or school committee shall 
vote to go into executive session. Such executive session may be 
held only for the purpose of discussing, deliberating or voting on 
those matters which by general or special statute, or federal grant-
in-aid requirements, cannot be made public, and those matters 
which if made public might adversely affect the public security, 
the financial interest of the district, city, town or local housing 
authority, or the reputation of any person; provided, however, that 
the meetings of any such board, commission or school committee, 
or any sub-committee thereof, which shall be investigating any 
board or agency of a municipal government, and the meetings of 
any committee however appointed or constituted which shall be 
investigating any legislation which could ultImately change or alter 
the existing governmental structure of a city or town, shall, at all 
times, be open to the public and to the press, notwithstanding a 
vote of such board, commission or school committee to go into 
executive session. 
Later on in the session, the General Court again amended the "Open 
Meeting" law by enacting Chapter 437 of the Acts of 1960, wherein 
provision is made for: (1) at least twenty-four hours' notice of each 
meeting of any county board or commission and appropriate posting 
10
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of such notice; (2) the procedure for giving notice, the proper post-
ing thereof, and filing of the minutes of boards or agencies of munici-
palities with the city or town clerk; (3) the maintenance of accurate 
records setting forth the acts taken at said meetings; (4) the regulation 
of the parliamentary procedure of such public open meetings; and (5) 
a provision for issuance of appropriate orders by Justices of the Su-
preme Judicial or Superior Court to compel compliance with the "Open 
Meeting" law. 
§18.23. Wage increases for city employees in years other than 
municipal election years. Section 33A of C.L., c. 44, which has proved 
to be a fruitful source of litigation in many cities and towns, provided 
that, inter alia, no ordinance increasing salaries of municipal officers or 
employees could be enacted unless it was to be operative during the 
financial year in which it was passed, with the proviso, however, that 
in any year other than a regular municipal election year, ordinances 
could be enacted by a two-thirds vote of the city council during the 
month of December providing for such increase to become effective on 
January 1 of the next ensuing year. Chapter 301 of the Acts of 1960, 
from the viewpoint of the time element involved, changed Section 33A 
by providing that these salary increase ordinances may be enacted dur-
ing the month of November as well as December. 
§18.24. Recording of vital statistics. Chapter 342 of the Acts of 
1960 amended the law relative to recording births, marriages, and 
deaths by providing that the city and town clerks may receive affidavits 
containing the proper facts required by record if the existing record 
concerning the birth, marriage, or death does not contain all of the 
required facts. Section 2 of Chapter 342 provides an explicit method 
of correcting the record of birth of an adopted person upon request of 
the adopting parents or the person adopted. The statute requires re-
ceipt of a certified copy of the Probate Court decree or affidavits, filed 
and sworn to by the adopting parents or by the person adopted, or, in 
the discretion of the clerk, affidavits by credible persons having personal 
knowledge of the case, and documentary evidence substantiating the 
necessary facts beyond reasonable doubt. 
§18.25. Collective bargaining between cities and towns and their 
employees. Chapter 561 of the Acts of 1960 amended C.L., c. 40, by 
adding a new section providing that any city or town may engage 
in collective bargaining with labor organizations representing its em-
ployees, except police officers, and may enter into agreements with such 
organizations. The amendatory act contains a home rule clause, pro-
viding that the new section is to take effect only when accepted by the 
city councilor by the town meeting. 
§18.26. Equal pay for men and women teachers. Chapter 344 of 
the Acts of 1960 requires that each city and town where the provisions 
of C.L., c. 71, §40, relative to equal pay for men and women teachers 
(or similar provisions) are not already in force submit Section 40 for 
acceptance, in a city by a vote at its next city election and in a town 
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by a vote at the annual town election held after the effective date of 
the chapter. 
§18.27. Counting of votes in town elections. Section 51 of G.L., 
c. 513, was amended by Acts of 1960, c. 434, to provide that no ballots 
cast at a state primary in cities or towns can be counted until after the 
close of the polls. 
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